

Neo-Orba: The Rise of Civil-Military Dictatorship in Indonesia

An Anarchist Analysis

Anonymous

May 2025

Contents

- A. Introduction** **3**

- B. Indonesia-Uruguay: Comparison Points** **4**
 - 1. Economic crisis, social unrest and militarization of the police 4
 - 2. Gradual accumulation of military power 5
 - 3. Formation of the National Security Council 9
 - 4. Increasingly strict social surveillance 10
 - 5. The existence of the military bourgeois class 12

- C. Neo-Orba Fruit of Failed Reform: Causal and Driving Factors** **14**

- D. Demands: Litura (the Five People’s Demands)** **18**
 - The Five People’s Demands (Litura) 20

A. Introduction

The main thesis of this document is that *the era of Reformation [Reformasi] has ended*. The Republic of Indonesia has gone through four periods of government, namely: the Old Order (1945–1966), the New Order [Orba] (1966–1998), the Reformation (1998–2024) and the current one, the Neo-Orba (2024-?). The Reformation only postponed defeat of democratic reform, or rather was a transitional stage, for the revival of the current regime born from the womb of the fascist, militaristic, and authoritarian New Order.

Approval of a revised Indonesian Military (TNI) Law in March 2025 has raised public concerns about military dictatorship. Some groups call the current regime the Neo-New Order (Neo-Orba), a fairly appropriate term because it is heading towards a return to military supremacy over civilians as in the Suharto era (1966–1998). However, some groups are a bit wrong and too dramatic because they want to call the current regime a military junta. A military dictatorship is a form of government in which the military holds most or all political power. Military dictatorships can be ruled by a high-ranking military officer or by a group of such officers (a military leadership committee) and often occur as a result of the overthrow of power through a coup. The Soeharto government, for example, was a military dictatorship because he formed the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib) in 1965 and took over power from Soekarno’s Old Order.

The current government in Indonesia is not a junta and is not a repetition of the New Order’s historical scenario. The current situation is more like, or more precisely, heading towards, a “civil military dictatorship” which was also used to describe the Uruguayan regime (1973–1985). Before the 1973 coup, the Uruguayan Left at that time also called it a “legal dictatorship”. This type of Uruguayan regime is different from dictatorships in other South American countries at that time, such as the coups in Paraguay (1954), Brazil (1964), Bolivia (1971), Chile (1973), Peru (1975), and Argentina (1976), where senior military officers suddenly seized power and immediately served as heads of state. In contrast, in Uruguay, the military regime seized power slowly and gradually from the civilian president who remained as head of state.

There are four points that make the rise of the civil-military dictatorship in Indonesia in 2025 similar to Uruguay 1973, namely:

1. economic crisis, social unrest and militarization of the police,
2. the gradual accumulation of military power,
3. the formation of the National Security Council, and
4. strict social supervision.

Even so, we acknowledge that there is one fundamental difference between the military dictatorship in Uruguay and Indonesia, namely:

5. the existence of a military capitalist class.

This document will initially discuss the five points of comparison one by one. After that, the analysis continues by reviewing the factors that allow the five things to happen. Finally, from the results of the analysis, a list of demands is formulated that are expected to destroy the civil-military dictatorship once and for all.

B. Indonesia-Uruguay: Comparison Points

1. Economic crisis, social unrest and militarization of the police

In both Uruguay and Indonesia, although in different forms, the economic crisis was followed by increasing popular resistance. From the 1950s onwards, the Uruguayan economy declined. In the late 1960s, household welfare in Uruguay plummeted as real wages fell and unemployment rose, and inflation continued to hover above 50% throughout the 1960s. In the early 1960s, social discontent due to the deepening economic crisis and increasing trade union agitation led to the imposition of martial law MPS. Under such circumstances the Uruguayan government could temporarily suspend certain constitutional guarantees in the event of serious and unforeseen internal unrest, including detention, torture and secret prisons. The year 1968 is generally associated with the more famous Paris protests. However, the General Secretary of the Uruguayan Communist Party, Rodney Arismendi, stated that the country had the highest relative index of strikes, general strikes and demonstrations in the entire capitalist world. The popular forces that most threatened the ruling class were consolidated into the CNT labor confederation which led a series of general strikes first in 1964, 1965, 1968, 1969, and finally in 1973 in the face of a coup.

Indonesia is not (read: not yet) facing an economic crisis as severe as Uruguay, but this is thought to be correlated with high levels of public unrest. The crisis was marked by declining purchasing power, a manufacturing sector that was surviving bankruptcy, mass layoffs, and a weakening rupiah, which caused public dissatisfaction and increased costs of basic necessities. In 2024, there was a spike in mass layoffs of 20.2% in various sectors, with 78,000 jobs lost. The rupiah exchange rate on the spot market set a record low after closing down 0.86% to Rp16,596 per US dollar on February 18, 2025. This is the rupiah's worst position since June 1998. In the last half decade, there has been a spike in demonstrations in Indonesia that have occurred in a number of waves. Corrupted Reform in 2019, Reject Omnibus Law in 2020, Democracy Emergency in 2024 until finally Dark Indonesia and Rejection of Military Law in 2025. This does not include sporadic and isolated protests and solidarity actions that may take place almost every day throughout the year between 2019 and 2025 around labor and agrarian conflicts.

Economic crises can lead to increased resistance and political instability. These upheavals have pushed governments, both in Uruguay and Indonesia, to strengthen the security and defense sector infrastructure, where most of the orientation of the army and police is not aimed at overcoming enemies or threats from abroad (external), but rather domestic threats (internal), namely the rebellion of their own people. Therefore, the police are needed to be non-literalized, namely the use of military equipment and tactics by law enforcement officers. With the explosion of the 1968 riots, the Uruguayan government recognized its weaknesses and addressed them with increased military and communications equipment, often purchased from the US government. Between May 1968 and January 1972, the government doubled the riot control inventory of the Montevideo police to include eleven armored vehicles, five SUVs with chicken wire barriers, three water

cannons, a large tour bus, one cattle truck (to transport seventeen riot control horses out of a total of 160 available), two thousand helmets (including 270 with plastic face masks), 87 plastic shields, 30 riot shields, 380 gas masks, and 99 gas guns. In Montevideo alone, more than 3,500 riot police were on standby for deployment.¹

We can observe changes in equipment and the addition of anti riot vehicles in Indonesia, such as the “pengurai massa” [mass disperser] (Raisa). Raisa is a tactical police car using a sound cannon that has caused permanent

¹ Compared to Indonesia, the militarization of the Uruguayan police above is considered very small, because the comparative scale is also small. In 1970, the phenomenon of urbanization caused many rural areas in Uruguay to experience depopulation. At that time, the total population of Uruguay was almost 2.9 million people, but almost half of them, around 1,362,000 people (46.9%) lived in the capital city of Montevideo (almost as large as the population of the city of Makassar today). Meanwhile, the total population of Indonesia reached 282 million people in 2024. In Uruguay's size, this militarization is a serious threat to dictatorship. See Troy Andreas Araiza Kokinis. *Anarchist Popular Power: Dissident Labor and Armed Struggle in Uruguay, 1956–76* (2023), p. 90.

hearing damage because it fires a very high decibel capacity (up to 160 dB measured at one meter from the device). For the record, the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) sets the standard for hazardous noise levels at 85 dB. In the 2019–2025 period, the National Police also purchased goods for handling mass demonstrations with a total budget of around IDR 3.8 trillion [225 million USD] sourced from public taxes. There are 11 types of categories of goods purchased by the National Police, 30 percent or IDR 1.53 trillion [91 million USD] of which is used to purchase a set of mass security equipment consisting of helmets, vests, shields, batons, elbow and knee protectors, and shields.² But what has recently become striking is the alleged corruption of the National Police, which until February 2024 had spent a budget of around IDR 188.9 billion [11 million USD] just to buy tear gas and equipment.³

In turn, police violence in response to social unrest also further radicalized the Left. Thus, there was a dialectical and interdependent relationship between militarization and increased police violence and the increasing militancy of the movement. In the midst of the Uruguayan crisis, the Uruguayan guerrilla group MLN–Tupamaros was born, which began operations involving theft of weapons, bombings targeting government officials and military officers, and kidnappings. However, armed resistance was not the sole domain of the MLN-T, as the Uruguayan Anarchist Federation (FAU) also began to form an armed wing, OPR-33, which focused on robberies and kidnappings/hostage-taking, although they never planned to kill their political opponents. By this time, there was a consensus that the conditions had allowed for a climate of popular violence. In the early 1960s, an average of ten incidents of violence per year had been recorded. However, by 1968, the number of recorded attacks had increased tenfold.⁴

In the case of Indonesia, radicalization can be observed visibly, especially in two things: in 2019 there was still a split in voices due to the disapproval of the masses for clashes or street battles and the continued use of campus/alma mater attributes; but in 2025 there was at least a consensus to allow or encourage a variety of tactics (including clashes and street battles), as well as a recommendation for the masses to wear all black. Outside Java, except for Makassar, the situation has not changed since 2019 due to the dominance of the Cipayung organization. As a note, despite high mobilization, most of the masses are still unorganized (liquid masses). That is why the escalation of resistance has not increased to the stage of a general strike (requiring the organization of labor unions) and armed guerrillas (requiring political organizations) as in Uruguay.

2. Gradual accumulation of military power

Although inaugurated in 1973, Uruguay’s slow road to dictatorship began slowly in the late 1960s. Throughout its history, the Uruguayan military had been a weak institution and largely subject to “democratic control”. This changed abruptly in the late 1960s, when a severe social, economic, and political crisis prompted the ruling elite to call on the armed forces to restore order. The military’s power and influence gradually increased, culminating in the 1973 coup.

Likewise, although the ratification of the Military Law in 2025 clearly marked a new chapter in the rise of militarism and gave an indication that Indonesia was heading in the same direction as Uruguay, the process had been taking place slowly since at least 2019. That year needs to be highlighted specifically because it was the initial stage of the strengthening of militarism pushed by Prabowo Subianto with the blessing of Jokowi’s “civilian regime”.

Prabowo’s profile must be explained first. Prabowo married President Soeharto’s biological daughter, divorced right when Soeharto stepped down in 1998; failed in the competition to become a presidential candidate from the Golkar Party in 2004, failed to be elected in the 2008 and 2014 elections; then failed again in the 2019 election which ended in a massive action by the National Movement for People’s Sovereignty (GNKR). Prabowo’s camp may have determined that 2019 must be the last presidential election defeat, and they tried in various ways to gain

² Indonesia Corruption Watch, “Rp3,8 Triliun Pajak Rakyat untuk Kekerasan: Polri Lebih Pilih Tameng dan Tongkat Ketimbang Negosiasi!”. Accessed from: https://antikorupsi.org/id/tp38-triliun_pajak-rakyat-untuk-kekerasan-polri-lebih-pilih-tameng-dan-tongkat_ketimbang-negosiasi

³ Indonesia Corruption Watch, “Habiskan Rp188,9 Miliar, Polisi Berpotensi Langgar Pembelian Gas Air Mata”. Accessed from: <https://antikorupsi.org/id/habiskan-rp1889-miliar-polisi-berpotensi-langgar-pembelian-gas-air-mata>

⁴ Ben Milligan. “Uruguay: 1973–85 – The Rise and Fall of Military Dictatorship in a Democratic Stronghold.” Accessed from: https://www.academia.edu/4179871/Uruguay_1973_85_The_Rise_and_Fall_of_Military_Dictatorship_in_a_Democratic_Stronghold

a strategic position in power. GNKR held an action to voice allegations of fraud in the 2019 election and rejected the KPU recapitulation results which won the Jokowi-Ma'ruf Amin pair. The action ended in a riot in which eight people were killed and 737 people were injured.

Ambitious and emotional character, contacts, military background and support, and alleged human rights violations, provide little clue about what will happen if Prabowo's camp loses again in the 2024 election. Although the possibility of a coup is very small, it is not zero. We must flashback.

On the morning of May 22, 1998, Wiranto reported to B.J. Habibie, who had just been inaugurated as the third President of Indonesia, that there had been a movement of Kostrad troops towards Jakarta and a concentration of troops at President Habibie's residence without his knowledge as Commander of ABRI. The movement of troops was suspected of being an attempted coup and therefore on President Habibie's instructions, Prabowo was dismissed as Commander of Kostrad. Prabowo emphasized that he was confident that he could have launched a coup during the days of the riots in May. But he explained, "I know, many of my soldiers will do what I order. But I do not want them to die fighting for my position. I want to show that I put the good of my country and people above my own position. I am a loyal soldier. Loyal to the country, loyal to the republic."⁵

We must not forget that in 2019, the National Police also found evidence of alleged treason by a number of retired Prabowo supporters, including the former Kopassus Commander Major General TNI (ret.) Soenarko, due to the possession of firearms that were suspected of being smuggled during the May 22, 2019 riots. In a press statement, the National Police Chief Tito Karnavian stated that he found a long barreled M4 weapon equipped with a silencer, two revolvers and a Glock along with 50 rounds of bullets. The former Chief of Staff of the Army Strategic Reserve Command Major General (ret.) Kivlan Zen was also named a suspect in a case of treason and possession of illegal firearms for the planned assassination of a national figure in June 2019. Finally, the former Metro Jaya Police Chief Inspector General (ret.) Sofyan Jacob was also named a suspect in a case of alleged treason through a video.

According to criminal law experts and human rights activists, the accusation of treason against a number of Prabowo's supporters because the call for "people power" is often wrong because it is not supported by strong evidence. Whether the treason conspiracy really happened or Jokowi's attempt to simply find a way to oppress the opposition leader is beyond our capacity to know. What is clear is that this must be taken into consideration so that President Jokowi took a surprising political maneuver where on October 11, 2019 the two met and it was decided that Prabowo would join the coalition cabinet. Four months later, Prabowo was appointed Minister of Defense, whose intervention made the Ministry of Defense's budget skyrocket since 2020 and took the largest portion of the national budget (APBN).

The Ministry of Defense budget has fluctuated in the last decade, but tends to increase. In 2014, it was IDR 86.2 trillion, slowly reaching IDR 150.43 trillion in 2022, then decreasing but peaking at IDR 165.2 trillion in 2025, an increase of 18.6% compared to 2024. This shows worrying symptoms of militarization. Since the reform era, Indonesia's defense budget has increased by more than 300%.⁶

However, the rise of militarism is going both ways at the same time. While outside the government, Prabowo has pushed the discourse of militarism. In the 2019 Presidential Election debate in March, Prabowo complained about the weak defense system, the too small defense budget, and the urgency of procuring defense equipment. From within, issues have also emerged about filling civilian positions by active TNI officers. In February 2019, TNI Information Case Major General Sisriadi made a statement that there was an excess number of middle-ranking and high-ranking officers so that they could not get positions. He hoped that TNI officers would get positions in ministries or institutions.⁷

In August 2022, Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment (Marves) Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan wrote to the President regarding Article 47 of the new Military Law. The letter contained a proposal for the addition

⁵ "Buku Putih" Prabowo: Kesaksian Tragedi Mei 1998. 2000. Popular News Magazine, *Totalitas*. Quotes from *Majalah Asiaweek*, No.3, March, 2000.

⁶ Experts say that 60% to 70% of the defense budget is spent on personnel needs such as salaries and allowances. The bloated territorial command structure also drains this budget. So the problem is not just a lack of budget, but the allocation of the budget. See BBC, "Disebut Prabowo 'terlalu lemah', seberapa kuat sistem pertahanan Indonesia?". Accessed from: <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-47764414>

⁷ Kompas.com, "Kapuspen TNI: Ada 40-60 Perwira TNI yang Bisa Ditempatkan di Kementerian/Lembaga". Accessed from: <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2019/02/06/12590491/kapuspen-tni-ada-40-60-perwira-tni-yang-bisa-ditempatkan-di>

No.	Ministries/Institutions	Budget (in trillion Rp)	Changes from the 2024 Budget
1.	Ministry of Defense	165,2	+18,6%
2.	Indonesian National Police	126	+7,3%
3.	Ministry of Health	90,6	+0,1%
4.	Ministry of Education	83,2	-16,0%
5.	Ministry of Religion	78	+5,3%
6.	Ministry of Social Affairs	77,2	-2,5%
7.	Ministry of Housing	75,6	-48,7%
8.	Ministry of Finance	53,2	+9,2%
9.	Ministry of Transportation	24,8	-35,8%
10.	Public Prosecution Service	23,3	+31,6%

Table: 10 Ministries/Institutions with the Largest Budgets in 2025

of institutions and ministries that could be filled by active soldiers. Slowly but surely, the process of accumulating the power of military officers took place. In 2023, the Head of the TNI Information Center, Rear Admiral Julius Widjojono, revealed that at that time there were around 3,000 active TNI soldiers serving in at least 16 ministries and non-military institutions. That number includes those assigned to institutions and ministries that are not regulated or permitted by the TNI Law. They serve in various positions. The soldiers assigned also come from different ranks, from privates to high-ranking officers. He himself admitted that the TNI Bill was considered important to provide a legal umbrella for active TNI soldiers who are currently serving in various ministries and institutions. Including ministries and institutions outside those permitted by Law 34/2004 concerning the TNI.⁸

So far, the TNI Law has limited only civilian positions in 10 ministries and institutions that can be occupied by active military personnel. Through the TNI Bill, the number has been increased to 14, but with provisions based on the request of the leaders of the relevant ministries/institutions, including: Coordinating Ministry for Political and Security Affairs; Ministry of Defense, including the National Defense Council (previously 2 different ministries/institutions); Presidential Secretariat and Presidential Military Secretariat; State Intelligence Agency; National Cyber and/or Crypto Agency; National Resilience Institute; National Search and Rescue (SAR) Agency; National Narcotics Agency (BNN); Supreme Court; National Border Management Agency (BNPP); National Disaster Management Agency (BNPN); National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT); Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla); and the Attorney General's Office of the Republic of Indonesia (Junior Attorney General for Military Crimes). Although currently only 14 ministries/institutions have been ratified, the discourse on the TNI Bill in 2023 was originally planned to target 19 ministries/institutions.⁹

Even before the TNI Bill was passed, since 2023 many active and retired officers have held civilian positions, even many outside the 14 ministries/institutions and BUMN regulated by the new TNI Law. For example:

- a. Rear Admiral Adin Nurwaluddin (TNI AL), holds the position of Director General of Marine Resources and Fisheries Supervision at the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (KKP).
- b. Brigadier General Ario Prawiseso (TNI AD), serves as Special Staff to the Minister of Tourism and Creative Economy for Tourism Destination Security and Strategic Issues.

⁸ News Detik, "Gerilya Militer di Kementerian dan Lembaga Sipil". Accessed from: <https://news.detik.com/x/detail/spotlight/20230524/Gerilya-Militer-di-Kementerian-dan-Lembaga-Sipil/>

⁹ News Detik, "Gerilya Militer di Kementerian dan Lembaga Sipil". Accessed from: <https://news.detik.com/x/detail/spotlight/20230524/Gerilya-Militer-di-Kementerian-dan-Lembaga-Sipil/>

- c. Major General Maryono (TNI AD) as Inspector General of the Ministry of Transportation.
- d. Major General Irham Waroihan (TNI AD) was also transferred to become Inspector General of the Ministry of Agriculture.
- e. First Admiral Ian Heriyawan (TNI AL) at the Hajj Organizing Agency (BPH).
- f. Under the Ministry of Transportation, there are several middle-ranking TNI AL officers who hold civilian positions. Some of them are Lieutenant Colonel Mar Triyanto who serves as Head of KSOP Class II Samarinda. Then there is Major Marinir Sandi Varikta who serves as Head of KSOP Class II Palembang. Others, Marine Lieutenant Colonel Eko Priyo Handoyo, who holds the echelon IIIb position as Head of Sailing Safety, Guarding, and Law Enforcement of the Batam Special KSOP Office.
- g. Lieutenant Colonel Tedy as Cabinet Secretary.
- h. Major General Ariyo Windutomo (Army) as Head of the Presidential Secretariat.
- i. Major General Novi Helmy Prasetya (Army), as President Director of Bulog.
- j. Major General Edi Kristianto (Army) as Commissioner of PT Wijaya Karya (WIKA), a state-owned construction company.
- k. General TNI Maruli Simanjuntak as President Commissioner of PT Pindad.
 - l. Chief of Naval Staff (KSAL) Admiral TNI Muhammad Ali as President Commissioner of PT PAL, a shipyard industry.
- m. General Andika Perkasa (Army) as President Commissioner of PT Pindad, a state-owned defense industry company.
- n. Air Marshal Andi Pahril Pahwi (Indonesian Air Force) as Commissioner of PT Bukit Asam, a state-owned coal mining company.
- o. Vice Admiral Achmad Djamaluddin (Indonesian Navy) as President Commissioner of PT Pelindo, a state-owned logistics and transportation (port) company.
- p. Air Marshal Donny Ernawan Taufanto (Indonesian Air Force) as President Commissioner of PT Dahana, a state-owned defense industry company.
- q. Air Marshal Fadjat Prasetyo (Indonesian Air Force) as President Commissioner of PT Dirgantara Indonesia, a state owned aviation industry company.
- r. Lieutenant General Herindra (Indonesian Army) as President Commissioner of PT LEN Industri, a state-owned railway signaling industry company.
- s. Lieutenant General (Ret.) Agus Utomo (Indonesian Army), President Director of PT Agrinas, a state-owned plantation company.
- t. Air Marshal (Ret.) Maroef Sjamsoeddin (Indonesian Air Force) as President Director of MIND ID, a state-owned mining industry holding company. Previously served as President Director of PT Freeport Indonesia (2015–2026).

Initially, there were 14 tasks in Military Operations Other Than War (OMSP), namely overcoming armed separatist movements; overcoming armed rebellions; overcoming acts of terrorism; securing border areas; securing strategic national vital objects; carrying out world peace tasks in accordance with foreign policy; securing the President and Vice President and their families; empowering defense areas and their supporting forces early in accordance with the universal defense system; assisting regional government tasks; assisting the Indonesian National Police in the context of security and public order tasks as regulated by law; assisting in overcoming the effects of natural disasters, evacuation, and providing humanitarian assistance; assisting in search and rescue in accidents; and assisting the Government in securing shipping and flights against piracy, hijacking, and smuggling. There are two additional tasks in the Military Bill in military operations other than war, namely assisting in efforts to overcome cyber threats; and assisting in protecting and rescuing citizens and national interests abroad. At the lowest hierarchy, all soldiers are deployed in domestic issues such as Free Nutritious Meals (MBG), LPG gas distribution, food security, guarding palm oil plantations, implementing National Strategic Projects (PSN) and regulating and guarding forest areas, even to managing the Hajj pilgrimage. Many of these deployments violate the military OMSP duties.

All the phenomena discussed above remind us of the peak of the ABRI dual function era that occurred in the 1990s, where at that time ABRI members held key roles in the government sector, starting from regents, mayors, provincial governments, ambassadors, heads of state owned companies, the judiciary, to ministers in Soeharto's cabinet.

3. Formation of the National Security Council

The National Security Council (NSC) is typically a government body of the executive branch responsible for coordinating policy or advising the chief executive on matters relating to national security. The role of the national security council has now become normalized even in countries that claim to be democratic. Historically, however, these bodies have often been the result of the establishment or maintenance of military dictatorships (or other national crises), have not always had constitutional approval, and are usually intended to have temporary powers (transitional governments).

In the case of Uruguay, President Bordaberry, rather than implementing structural reforms to address the growing economic and political crisis—including a 94 percent increase in the cost of living since 1972—made room for the Armed Forces as the new “center of power.” On February 8, 1973, he attempted to assert his authority over the military and appointed a retired general as the new Minister of National Defense. The Navy initially supported the appointment, while the commanders of the Army and Air Force flatly rejected it and on February 9 and 10 issued public statements demanding radical changes in the country's political and economic system. They promised to end unemployment, support local industry, eradicate corruption, implement land reform, and end all terrorism. Bordaberry bowed to the pressure and on February 12, at Air Force headquarters, concluded an agreement with the armed forces commanders to provide for the military's involvement in politics in an “advisory” role. Eventually, a National Security Council (Consejo de Seguridad Nacional, COSENA) was created, composed of the commanders of the Army, Air Force, and Navy and the Ministers of National Defense, Interior, Economy, and Foreign Affairs. Since then, they have effectively controlled the country and Bordaberry has saved his office by participating in a self-coup, that is, staging a coup against himself.

In Indonesia, the formation of the National Security Council (DKN) is actually an old issue. President Soekarno once issued PP No. 17/1954 concerning the National Security Council (DKN), which in its implementation became the Security Council. Although during the New Order, the National Defense Security Council was established in 1970, its practical and operational functions were held by Kopkamtib (disbanded in 1988, replaced by Bakorstanas which was disbanded in 2000). During the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administration, the National Security Bill (Kamnas) submitted to the DPR was also criticized and rejected, so that the Kamnas Bill was then returned and failed to be passed. In 2020 during the Jokowi administration, the issue of forming the DKN resurfaced, which we suspect was driven by Prabowo Subianto who at that time had been Minister of Defense since the previous year.

The function of providing advice, suggestions, support, and recommendations to the president has been carried out by several institutions, such as the National Resilience Institute (Lemhannas), the Presidential Advisory Council

(Wantimpres), the National Resilience Council (Wantannas), and the Presidential Staff Office (KSP). That is why, the discourse on the formation of the National Security Council (DKN) is feared to cause overlap with existing state institutions, and especially, the government is suspected of “forming a new repressive vehicle like the formation of the Security and Order Restoration Operation Command (Kopkamtib) during the New Order.”¹⁰

Although the formation of the DKN failed during Prabowo’s term as minister, only two months after being inaugurated by the President, Prabowo in December 2024 issued a Presidential Decree establishing the National Defense Council (DPN), so that Wantannas was disbanded. The structure of the DPN consists of a chairman chosen by the President, as well as a number of permanent and non-permanent members. Permanent members of the DPN consist of a number of high-ranking officials, such as the Vice President, Minister of Defense, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Home Affairs, and Commander of the TNI. In addition, it also includes the Minister of State Secretary, Minister of Finance, Head of the State Intelligence Agency and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces in the ranks of DPN members. The DPN is not controversial because the Civil Society Coalition in its release argued that by referring to Law on State Defense No. 3/2002, the Government was asked to form the National Defense Council (DPN), not the National Security Council (DKN). This is a blunder, because the real intention of the interested groups to push for the formation of the DKN is to simply change its name to DPN.

Given the strong push for the formation of the DKN since the SBY era and especially after Prabowo became Minister of Defense, the formation of the DPN is suspected of being an effort to maximize the power and influence of the military over civilian elements in the government. If the leadership of the country falls back into civilian hands in the 2029 Presidential Election, then the current military elite class need not worry so much if the military’s influence is suppressed or weakened, because the DPN has been formed to be able to anticipate the balance of power. In addition, in a state of instability and emergency in the future, perhaps the DPN will run the interim government after the military takeover of power, where one of the DPN’s tasks is to “draft policies related to the deployment of defense components in mobilization and demobilization.” Thus, if needed, the DPN is the legal infrastructure that may be needed to implement a junta government. Although the DPN is expected to only provide considerations, in reality it can easily become a means to involve the military in political decision-making, because that is how COSENA worked in the case in Uruguay.

4. Increasingly strict social surveillance

In May 1971, the Uruguayan government required all households to register their family members with the local police; this was an attempt by the police to prevent political gatherings by monitoring homes that held gatherings larger than the registered number. The program’s designers, who drew their inspiration from Nazi counter espionage, hoped that its implementation would spread social fear of gathering in private.¹¹

Specifically for this 4th point, it is not Indonesia that resembles Uruguay, but Uruguay that resembles Indonesia. The Indonesian military has implemented a social control mechanism since 1950 with the implementation of the Army & Territory (TT) command, which was later restructured into the Territorial Command (Koter). President Soekarno’s Decree on July 5, 1959, provided a constitutional basis for the political role of ABRI (Indonesia Armed Forces) as a functional group and socio-political force. In 1962, ABRI formed a Koramil in every sub-district, Babinsa in every village, and student regiments on campus. Although the main focus of the Territorial Command was initially on defense and security, not politics, over time it became the military chain of command in maintaining political stability in its region. For example, in the 1960s Army troops were spread out into the community to thwart the Indonesia Communist Party (PKI).¹²

From the central level down, the Territorial Command hierarchy starts from Kodam (Province), Korem (district/city), Kodim (level II region, city/district), Koramil (sub-district), and Babinsa (village/sub-district). Even so, TT

¹⁰ Koalisi Masyarakat Sipil, “Membahayakan Demokrasi, Dewan Keamanan Nasional Kopkamtib Gaya Baru”. Accessed from: <https://ylbhi.or.id/informasi/siaran-pers/membahayakan-demokrasi-dewan-keamanan-nasional-kopkamtib-gaya-baru/>

¹¹ See Troy Andreas Araiza Kokinis. *Anarchist Popular Power: Dissident Labor and Armed Struggle in Uruguay, 1956–76* (2023), PG 154.

¹² John Roosa, *Riwayat Terkubur: Kekerasan Antikominis 1965–1966 di Indonesia* (2004), hlm 77–78. Lihat juga, Petrik Matanasi, “Sejarah Kodam & Bagaimana Nasution Merancang Pertahanan Teritorial”. Diakses dari: <https://tirto.id/sejarah-kodam-bagaimana-nasution-merancang-pertahanan-teritorial-eT1W>

used to develop in a context, namely controlling and launching military operations during the guerrilla war against the Dutch. While the Territorial Command refers to efforts to process resources in order to support defense efforts effectively. When Indonesia became independent as it is today, the army did not manage resources. Those resources are under the authority of the government.¹³

The concept of Territorial Command is basically the essence of dual function, because the dual role that covers the socio-political realm requires infrastructure that can support the military to move directly in the midst of society, and this structure is realized by the Territorial Command. That is why the expansion of the Territorial Command means the expansion of the reach of the military tentacles. The emergency is that the Indonesian Army is secretly undergoing significant changes, which are marked by the expansion of its territorial organization, namely:

- a. Plans are to establish 22 new Regional Military Commands (Kodam), a big jump from the current 15 (to 37). By 2025, five of the new Kodams are expected to be operational. The ultimate goal is that almost every province will have its own army command.¹⁴
- b. Plans to form 100 Territorial Development Battalions (BTP) by 2025 and deploy these units in every district across the country within five years. The planned battalions will have elements of agricultural, fisheries, livestock and health companies.¹⁵
- c. When he became Minister of Defense in 2021, Prabowo announced plans to recruit 25,000 Reserve Component (Komcad) personnel, which currently only stands at 9,719 personnel.¹⁶

Several investigative reports also noted the possibility of Israeli-made Pegasus wiretapping devices in Indonesia purchased through Singapore. The State Intelligence Agency (BIN), National Police Headquarters, BSSN and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) are suspected of using the device since 2018. The cost of bringing in this device is not small. Pegasus is priced at at least IDR 500 billion to IDR 1 trillion. In 2019, the National Cyber and Crypto Agency (BSSN) and Information Technology experts agreed that Pegasus was illegal because it was a “serious crime under the ITE Law.” Both the TNI Bill and the Polri Bill provide expanded authority to the realm of digital surveillance. Article 7 of the TNI Bill includes two additional TNI duties in military operations other than war, namely assisting in efforts to combat cyber threats. Active TNI military officers are also allowed to serve in the BSSN. Article 16 paragraph 1 letter q of the Polri Bill also gives the Polri the authority to take action, block, disconnect, and slow down access to cyberspace on the grounds of domestic security. Police Regulation (Perpol) No.3/2025 also contains a point that regulates police letters for foreign journalists. This regulation is considered a means to hinder transparency of information to the outside world.

If there had been internet in Uruguay in the early 1970s, it is predictable that there would have been similar forms of surveillance, both physically in the territorial realm and digitally. But when compared to Uruguay, Indonesia’s social surveillance structure is more massive and systematic. Moreover, the implementation in Uruguay was temporary during martial law because the government declared Internal War (Guerra Interna) in 1972, which was nothing more than a war against the people who armed themselves. In contrast, the Territorial Command was designed as a permanent defense system, but in practice it has become a panopticon to anticipate popular rebellion. The implementation of the Territorial Command ultimately resulted in an overlap between military duties which in practice often threatened human rights with the internal security duties of the police.

¹³ BBC Indonesia, “Kesaksian mantan jenderal yang dulu berupaya hapus Dwifungsi ABRI – ‘Saya melawan arus dan dikeroyok’”. Diakses dari: <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/articles/cg4kwx6lk44o>

¹⁴ Kompas.com, “TNI AD Ingin Bangun 22 Kodam Baru, KSAD Sebut Agar Imbang dengan Polda”. Diakses dari: <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/03/07/19261031/tni-ad-ingin-bangun-22-kodam-baru-ksad-sebut-agar-imbang-dengan-polda?page=all>.

¹⁵ Antaranews.com, “Batalyon infanteri teritorial untuk percepatan pembangunan”. Diakses dari: <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/03/07/19261031/tni-ad-ingin-bangun-22-kodam-baru-ksad-sebut-agar-imbang-dengan-polda?page=all>.

¹⁶ CNN Indonesia, “Prabowo Target 25 Ribu Personel Komcad Terbentuk Tahun Ini”. Diakses dari: <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20210312125009-20-616659/prabowo-target-25-ribu-personel-komcad-terbentuk-tahun-ini>.

5. The existence of the military bourgeois class

Throughout its history, the Uruguayan military had been a weak institution and largely subject to democratic control. This changed abruptly in the late 1960s, when a severe social, economic, and political crisis prompted the ruling elite to call on the armed forces to restore order. In late 1972, Bordaberry attempted to limit the military's growing political power. At a meeting with Bordaberry on October 19, 1972, the military chiefs presented an eight-point program that called for the non-transferability of commanding officers, military participation in state enterprises, independence of military corruption investigations, and military control over the police. Although one of the Uruguayan military's demands in 1972 was involvement in state enterprises, the 1973 coup did not effectively create a new military-bourgeoisie.

The story is different in the case in Indonesia. The dual function system became the basis of the armed forces' power in the regions, allowing them to access economic resources at the grassroots level (facing the people) and maintain their role as important players in local politics. This allowed the military to access illegal funding. This process was not something that only emerged during the New Order. At the beginning of independence, the struggle agencies and militias that became the embryo of ABRI also started their businesses. In the period 1959–1969, military control over the newly nationalized businesses was increasingly consolidated. This placement was not without purpose; it was specifically done to help fund the military so that they did not need to rely on central funds. Funds obtained from the opium trade, smuggling and trade in agricultural products were usually used to finance the struggle and buy weapons. However, this also perpetuated corrupt practices among officers — money that should have gone into the institutional treasury instead went into personal pockets.¹⁷

Through the business process, which has been made easier since the New Order, a class slowly emerged called the “military bureaucrat capitalist” or in this document, we abbreviate it as the military bourgeoisie. Simply put, the bourgeoisie is a term used to refer to a social class that has wealth (means of production) and economic power. In the classical sense, the interests of these bourgeoisie can be met when they work together with politicians who will defend their interests in parliament or government bureaucracy. But in many cases, a bourgeoisie also enters politics and ends up holding a position in government to defend the economic interests of themselves and their group; this makes them a bourgeois-bureaucrat (like Jokowi). In 2019, of the 575 members of the DPR, 262 people (55%) had a background as entrepreneurs.¹⁸ This number has increased to at least 354 individuals out of a total of 580 (around 61%) members of the DPR for the 2024–2029 period who have a background or affiliation with the business sector.¹⁹ Bourgeois-bureaucrats are dangerous because in their hands, politics only becomes a means to facilitate their business, including perhaps the Job Creation Law.

The military bourgeoisie is the third type, which flourished and appeared openly during the New Order, but was less visible and still waiting for its moment during the reformation. If a soldier does business and eventually enters the government, that makes him a soldier-ruler-entrepreneur. Soeharto is an example of a military bourgeois class, because as a soldier, in 1957 he formed the Yayasan Pembangunan Teritorium Empat, until finally in 1966 he was appointed President of the Republic of Indonesia.

At the beginning of the 2001 Reformation, the number of businesses by military cooperatives was 923 (Army), 147 (Air Force) and 124 (Navy). The inventory of TNI military businesses included 25 foundations, 89 companies under foundations and 105 businesses, and in March 2006 included 1520 business units. The very rapid growth of military businesses under Soeharto, both legal and illegal, reflected the strong position of the military as the center of power in Indonesian society. One method used to control military businesses was to establish non-profit foundations. This method allowed them to run their businesses independently of the government, while still receiving financial

¹⁷ Julianto Ibrahim. “Militer dan Kapitalisme Ersatz: Bisnis ABRI pada masa Orde Baru,” dalam *Humaniora*, XIV, No.3/2002, hlm 286–294. Lihat juga, Rizki M Hakim, *Kapitalisme Militer: Akumulasi Sumber Daya Ekonomi Militer melalui Perampasan Lahan (Studi Kasus Perampasan Lahan oleh TNI/AD di Urutsewu)* (2025).

¹⁸ Tempo, “Para Pengusaha Yang Duduk DiKursi DPR”. Diakses dari: <https://www.tempo.co/data/data/para-pengusaha-yang-duduk-dikursi-dpr-1003893>

¹⁹ Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), “61 Persen Anggota DPR 2024–2029 Merupakan Politisi Pebisnis”. Diakses dari: <https://antikorupsi.org/id/61-persen-anggota-dpr-2024-2029-merupakan-politisi-pebisnis>

support from the state. Since the issuance of the Military law in 2004, the military has begun to sell off its businesses, but the overall structure of military economic activities has not undergone any fundamental changes.²⁰

In the current Neo-Orba era, there seems to be a trend of expansion not only of military-owned businesses but also of more and more active and retired officers occupying BUMN. This military bourgeois class is as dangerous as other types of bourgeois. When they enter government, they will prioritize their economic interests. This behavior was shown by Prabowo, when he said, “Many of my assets are stagnant, can’t get credit. Because I haven’t been in power for 20 years.”²¹ Prabowo is the Chairman of the Advisory Board of the Defense Resources Potential Development Foundation (YPPSDP), where YPPSDP formed a subsidiary of PT Agro Industri Nasional (Agrinas). PT Agrinas will take over the palm oil plantation company PT Duta Palma in Riau and Sambas-Bengkayang, West Kalimantan, whose management is currently facing corruption and money laundering cases. 30% of PT Duta Palma’s shares were once known to be owned by the military.²² During the strike process, PT Duta Palma workers faced the military and in the takeover of the plantation by PT Agrinas, workers also faced the military. The President Director of Agrinas, held by Lieutenant General (Ret.) Agus Utomo, confirmed that officers in the military would later be recruited by his company to fill managerial and security positions.²³ The Gecko Project and Tempo investigative report shows that PT Agrinas is preparing to reap profits from the food barn project by trying to attract investment of around Rp 33 trillion, despite violating various regulations, destroying forests and being filled with numerous conflicts of interest.²⁴

As a bureaucrat and politician, Prabowo must serve the interests of the coalition and allies. At the same time, he must also serve the interests of his seniors and juniors while on duty, because the esprit de corps is carried over even though he has retired. Several military figures, some of whom are retired, who were rumored to be part of the Mawar Team, a team in the Army suspected of being behind the kidnapping of activists in 1998 in which Prabowo was involved, still exist and have obtained prestigious positions in the Prabowo-Gibran era. There are four people. They include Untung Budiharto who currently serves as Commissioner of Transjakarta, Dadang Hendrayuda as Deputy for Monitoring and Supervision of the National Nutrition Agency, Nugroho Sulisty Budi who has been inaugurated as Head of BSSN, and the Governor of North Sulawesi Yulius Selvanus.²⁵ Therefore, in return for succession to power, a bourgeois-military-bureaucrat also incurs a greater political debt.

Military elites who are allowed to manage businesses have the potential to abuse institutional authority, personnel, and firearms in competing with civilian businesses or entrepreneurs. Military officers who serve as company leaders can also abuse their authority and mix personal interests with institutional interests. This is not something to be worried about because it will happen. Many reports show evidence that this *has happened*.²⁶

²⁰ Human Right Watch, *Harga Selangit, Hak Asasi Manusia sebagai Ongkos Kegiatan Ekonomi Politik Militer Indonesia* (2006).

²¹ Viva.co.id. “Prabowo Blak-blakan sebut Asetnya Banyak Mandek Karena Tak Berkuasa 20 Tahun”. Diakses dari: <https://www.viva.co.id/berita/nasional/1639554-prabowo-blak-blakan-sebut-asetnya-banyak-mandek-karena-tak-berkuasa-20-tahun>

²² David Gilbert, *Duta Palma’s Filthy Supply Chain: A Case Study Of A Palm Oil Supplier In Indonesia*, Rainforest Action Network.

²³ Tempo.co. “4 Fakta Penting Agrinas”. Diakses dari: <https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/4-fakta-penting-agrinas-1225578>

²⁴ The Gecko Project dan Tempo.co. “Kroni Prabowo Kepung Proyek Lumbung Pangan, Ancam Lingkungan dan Habitat Orangutan”. Diakses dari: <https://thegeckoproject.org/id/articles/politically-connected-firm-seeks-to-profit-as-indonesian-government-cuts-down-orangutan-habitat/>

²⁵ Bisnis.com, “Deretan TNI Aktif & Purnawirawan di BUMN: dari Bulog hingga MIND ID”, Diakses dari: <https://kabar24.bisnis.com/read/20250304/15/1844456/deretan-tni-aktif-purnawirawan-di-bumn-dari-bulog-hingga-mind-id>.

²⁶ Human Right Watch, *Harga Selangit, Hak Asasi Manusia sebagai Ongkos Kegiatan Ekonomi Politik Militer Indonesia* (2006). Lihat juga Jurnal WACANA No.17/2004. “Negeri Tentara: Membongkar Politik Ekonomi Militer”.

C. Neo-Orba Fruit of Failed Reform: Causal and Driving Factors

There were a number of “news” during the Reformasi era. Some of these included the push for stronger state democracy and civilian government, while military elements still tried to maintain their influence (Dwifungsi ABRI). In addition, the growth of Islamism in politics and society resulted in political parties no longer being limited to just three parties as was the case during the Suharto era and also not being required to have Pancasila as their ideology through TAP MPR No. XVIII/MPR/1998. The reform process has resulted in greater freedom of speech, in contrast to the widespread censorship under the New Order. This has resulted in more open political debate in the news media and increased expression in the arts with the dissolution of the Department of Information. The 1999 legislative election was the first free general election since 1955. Demands for greater regional autonomy also gave birth to Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Government. Finally, rampant corruption, collusion and nepotism led to the establishment of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in 2002.

There has been no conjunctural analysis that comprehensively reviews the ups and downs of the problems of the post-Soeharto era. The most important is the success of military elements in enlarging and expanding their influence and power, as previously described, which practically shows the symptoms of the return of the ABRI Dual Function. In reality, the sole principle of Pancasila has effectively been in effect since Law No. 2/1999 concerning Political Parties to its subsequent laws. Since early 2019, conservative Islamic groups have also pushed for a revision of the Criminal Code, including a ban on premarital sex, living together outside of marriage, practicing black magic, and abortion without medical emergency reasons and rape, which have been a disaster for women and religious and gender minorities. The revised Criminal Code also criminalizes insults to the president, vice president, religion, state institutions and state symbols such as the flag and national anthem. From the Yos Suprpto painting exhibition, the drama performance of Interview with Mulyono by Teater Payung Hitam, to the Sukatani band case, concerns have begun to emerge about violations of freedom of expression that criticize the ruling class and its apparatus. Not to forget, the revision of the KPK Bill has been widely criticized by activists and experts for reducing the effectiveness of the KPK, which led to a wave of #ReformasiDikorupsi demonstrations in 2019. At a glance, the defining characteristics of the Reformation above are slowly starting to erode and regress, both legally and formally and in reality on the ground.

Thus, we conclude that the Republic of Indonesia has entered a new type of government period. We call it the Neo-Orba era. Terminologically, this term is somewhat problematic because neo means “new”, and Neo-Orba literally means “new-new-order”. However, definitively and philosophically this term is appropriate because it refers to the “renewed New Order”, or Orba 2.0. Not only because it is suspected of heading towards a military dictatorship like the Orba, but also because its spirit and actors are direct legacies of the Orba. Neo-Orba typologically resembles, or will head towards a “civil military dictatorship” like Uruguay. Unlike juntas or military dictatorships in general (such as Chile or Myanmar), as far as we have compiled this document, Neo-Orba is a dictatorship regime that has a mixed, gradual and legal nature.

First, the amalgam/mixed nature, because it is not (or not yet?) entirely military, but with the involvement and collaboration of increasingly weakened civilian influence. President Jokowi’s civilian regime is exactly like Uruguayan President Bordaberry, because only through the blessing of both of them did the process towards a civil military dictatorship become possible. For reasons of stability, Bordaberry approved the implementation of martial law which actually strengthened the influence and power of his increasingly brazen military officers. In the Indonesian context, Jokowi also seems to feel that Prabowo’s opposition could bring serious problems so that for reasons of unity, he prefers to embrace Prabowo. This maneuver is expensive because it gradually worsens relations with his Mami political party, PDIP and Megawati, while also becoming a gap for the rise of military elements (both active and

retired officers). The problem is, the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs Luhut Panjaitan is already behind Jokowi's various political tactics. Prabowo's joining the 2019 fat coalition makes the fragile Jokowi carry on his shoulders a pair of influential figures over the military elements.

Second, the gradual nature, because it is slow, and not through a quick and sudden takeover of power. Just as Bordaberry allowed the accumulation of military power since the late 1960s, Jokowi also tends to allow it during 2019–2024. When Prabowo becomes president in 2025, the accumulation that has been going on will be consolidated more smoothly. So, it is a big mistake to think that the TNI Bill will restore the dual function of the ABRI after it is passed in 2025, on the contrary the TNI Law only legalizes the dual function that has been going on since 2019. The News Detik report describes this as “Military Guerrilla in Ministries and Civil Institutions”,¹ while political observer Made Supriatma calls it “Crawling Dual Function.”² The point is the same, namely the expansion and strengthening of military power slowly, quietly, and with little public attention. When the attention that was due for it happened, namely with the ratification of the TNI Bill, it was too late. We were caught off guard. The various placements of military officers seemed to take place almost under the radar for a number of reasons, namely:

- a. Public attention is not focused, but is diverted by viral news of other socio-political chaos, ranging from Gibran's candidacy to Pertamina Corruption;
- b. The placement of officers by the majority of the people is considered normal because the presence of the military in everyday life has been normalized.;
- c. The tendency of the majority of political (and civil) elites to deny, ignore, or keep quiet about the reality of dual function;
- d. The change in Prabowo's campaign image strategy as a hardline patriot-nationalist in 2019, to a flamboyant figure in the 2024 presidential election, which deceives the reality that behind it militarization has occurred; and
- e. The emergence of obfuscating terms such as “Multifunctional TNI”, which is considered as “an effort to cover up the stigma, guilt, or shame of militaristic [Dual function] practices.”³

Ketiga, The last one is the legal nature, because it has not/has not been through armed violence (coup, rebellion or political revolution) illegally. In Uruguay, they also call the Bordaberry regime a “legal dictatorship”. We must not forget that in a similar context, Paul von Hindenburg played a key role in the Nazi seizure of power in 1933 when he appointed Adolf Hitler as German chancellor; Hindenburg won the 1933 election while Hitler came in second in the vote count. In Indonesia, the political elites saw that being in opposition was too expensive and detrimental. This was not commensurate with the goal as bourgeois-bureaucrats to accumulate as much wealth as possible in the shortest time (five years). So the possibility that was more beneficial to their own class other than through a coup was to hold a bargaining session which would result in a coalition cabinet, equal distribution of positions, fair quotas for tenders and projects, facilitating the issuance of regulations or permits, sharing shares or company mergers, and other forms of cooperation and compensation.

We feel the need to discuss the driving factors that later gave birth to Neo-Orba. We distinguish between, causal factors, namely things that directly cause an event, with driving factors, namely things that support, enable or accelerate the occurrence of the event.

Liberals tend to find it easier to blame Jokowi's “civil regime” for opening the door to Prabowo as a factor causing the civil-military dictatorship that is being formed. Meanwhile, Islamic fundamentalists, whose influence has been growing in recent decades, will usually wrongly and in an overly simplistic way accuse this of being a consequence of democracy, so that as a solution they support a change in the system towards an Islamic Caliphate.

¹ News Detik, “Gerilya Militer di Kementerian dan Lembaga Sipil”. Diakses dari: <https://news.detik.com/x/detail/spotlight/20230524/Gerilya-Militer-di-Kementerian-dan-Lembaga-Sipil/>

² Made Supriatma, “Expansion of the Indonesian Army: A Creeping Dual Function?” Diakses dari: <https://fulcrum.sg/expansion-of-the-indonesian-army-a-creeping-dual-function/>

³ Ariel Heryanto, “Dwifungsi Tidak Kembali” dalam *Kompas*, Sabtu, 5 April 2025.

But for anarchists, the country cannot be democratic. In reality, we have never enjoyed democracy because we have never been involved in decision-making that will directly affect our own lives. Anarchists distinguish between direct democracy, which can only take place in autonomous communities, without a state, which are decentralized, but connected to each other in a federalist structure; with parliamentary democracy from a liberal republican state where a handful of people who get privileges as a result of elections (electoralism) decision-making is carried out centrally by a handful of people, separate and disconnected from the masses. For anarchists, the Neo-Orba is not as simple as the absence of good people to occupy seats of power and therefore eventually seized by bad people. Civilians are no better than military. This is a structural problem, not a personal one, which is a direct result of the institution of centralization of power itself (read: the state). For anarchists, all regimes and rulers are oppression. The transition from the Reformation era to the Neo-Orba was merely a transition from civil oppression to semi-military oppression.

Meanwhile, our reading points to three supporting factors that allowed the Neo-Orba civil-military dictatorship to develop. In essence, the Reformation era (1998–2024) with its grand democratization agenda has failed in two ways:

First, the Reformation era failed to prosecute Soeharto and his cronies. Soeharto was not tried because the Attorney General's team of doctors in 2003 determined that Soeharto had permanent brain damage so that he could no longer provide correct information in court. This was strengthened by the Supreme Court's (MA) decision to stop the trial until Soeharto recovered and the case files were returned to the Attorney General's Office. Until his death in 2008, Soeharto was never really sentenced. In fact, as is known, Soeharto was dragged to court for alleged embezzlement (corruption) in managing seven foundations, whose funds came from donations and state funds, which caused state finances a loss of Rp 1.3 trillion. Soeharto was not tried for the 1965 Massacre and other human rights violations.

In the 1999 election, the PRD was the only political party that put forward 10 urgent programs, one of the demands of which was to prosecute Soeharto. They failed. The students' struggle for the implementation of the Total Revolution Program was met with brutal repression by the security forces of the Habibie regime led by Wiranto. At that time, the beginning of the Reformation era also did not eradicate the remnants of Soeharto's supporters, especially from the military who were still quite influential in the Habibie government cabinet. After that, the voices of demands to prosecute human rights violating generals, including Prabowo, were only faintly heard, or only emerged before the election, then faded again when the election was over. In late 1998 and 1999, the trial of the Rose Team, a kidnapping squad for activists, did not involve Prabowo (at that time a former Kopassus Commander General) who was abroad and then received Jordanian citizenship. *Tempo* magazine editorial in January 1999 stated that it was impossible for the Rose Team to act purely on their own initiative and without orders from their superiors: "The spotlight is only on Prabowo alone, even though there are many other high-ranking officers who could not possibly not have known, and may even have been involved. Former Commander of the V Jaya Military Command Major General Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin and Prabowo's superiors are never mentioned again now. [...] But regardless of personal issues, it is impossible to imagine Prabowo free from responsibility. The military auditor's report that a US Kopassus Major, because of 'a call of his conscience' to secure the nation's interests, formed a task force consisting of seven captains [!] and three other non-commissioned officers to kidnap radical activists, would not be acceptable to the common sense of even village people. Unless it is acknowledged that there were orders or approval from superiors."⁴

As a result, without a trial of military officers suspected of human rights violations, the Reformation era became a regime of impunity, where they were no longer afraid to restore military supremacy but only needed to do it slowly and inconspicuously. Elections in Indonesia also felt like a monarchical succession, a shameless power struggle of the nobles, where heirs elbowed each other to fight for the crown: Gibran succeeded Jokowi, Megawati and Puan Maharani succeeded Soekarno, then Prabowo succeeded his father-in-law, Soeharto.

Second, the problem of excess high-ranking officers (pati) and colonels. Sources from the Ministry of Defense in 2017 stated that there were 141 excess high-ranking officers and 790 colonels in all TNI ranks. According to the author's analysis, this problem has occurred for a relatively long time (starting in 2011), which is essentially an

⁴ Editorial. "Mahkamah untuk Prabowo", *Tempo*, 4 Januari 1999. In: Muhidin M. Dahlan. 2024. *Kronik Penculikan Aktivistis dan Kekerasan Negara 1998*. I:BOEKOE. Pg 358.

accumulation of unresolved TNI strength development policy issues in the past, namely since the enactment of the old TNI Law in 2004. The causes are 1) changes in the retirement age regulated in article 71 (officers from 55 to 58 years old); 2) the policy of providing leadership cadres through general development education at the middle level which is not in line with the career development policy at the Colonel rank level in each Armed Forces; 3) the TNI personnel career development system that “half forces” every personnel to have a career as a TNI soldier until the maximum retirement age.⁵

The problem is, the new TNI Law in 2025 regulates the retirement age limit for soldiers, with Bintara and Tamtama retiring at 55 years old, Officers up to Colonels 58 years old, High-ranking Officers 1 to 60 years old, 2 stars to 61 years old, and 3 stars to 62 years old. High-ranking Officers 4 Stars: Maximum 63 years old and can be extended a maximum of two times according to the President’s needs. So, the new TNI Law will likely make things worse because the number of officers is overflowing. Instead of carrying out internal restructuring of the military, the TNI has proposed that officers who do not have positions can occupy civilian positions. Although Jokowi stated in 2022 that the placement of active officers was not urgent, it was only a matter of time when the authority for placement fell into the hands of a supporter of militarism: Prabowo.

Third, because it did not disband the Territorial Command (Koter). In the early days of the Reformation, it was agreed that the Army’s territorial command structure would be abolished, with the note that its implementation would be adjusted to the readiness of the Police who would be fully responsible for domestic security. The military only focuses on defense against threats from abroad. It is recommended that the Koter structure be reorganized towards an integrated military base (basmil) structure with sophisticated equipment centered in several strategic military base points in areas near the country’s borders, which synergize with the relevant provincial governments.⁶ But in the discussion of the 2004 Military Law, the discourse on eliminating territorial commands was hotly debated in the DPR. The structure was not abolished and still exists today.⁷ Reform maintains and protects Territorial Command like cancer, and when Prabowo gained power, the cancer was immediately fed until it had the potential to reach stage 4 and immediately eat away at the joints of society.

In conclusion, dual function has never really disappeared. As Ariel Heryanto said, “Dual function has not gone anywhere from the country for more than half a century. It has bloomed, sometimes shrunk, but has never disappeared.”⁸

⁵ Wira, Media Informasi Kementerian Pertahanan, Edisi Maret-April 2018 Vol.71/No.55.

⁶ Soe Tjen Marching. 2023. Yang Tak Kunjung Padam: Narasi Eksil Politik Indonesia di Jerman. EA Books. Hlm 438.

⁷ BBC Indonesia, “Kesaksian mantan jenderal yang dulu berupaya hapus Dwifungsi ABRI – ‘Saya melawan arus dan dikeroyok’”. Diakses dari: <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/articles/cg4kwx6lk44o>

⁸ Ariel Heryanto, “Dwifungsi Tidak Kembali” dalam *Kompas*, Sabtu, 5 April 2025.

D. Demands: Litura (the Five People's Demands)

Based on the analysis above, the destruction of the civil military dictatorship needs to be carried out comprehensively, covering various aspects, both treating the symptoms or nature that have been discussed in the comparative points, and eliminating the driving factors. The goal;

- a. prevent the situation from worsening where the Neo-Orba accelerates into a civil-military dictatorship with full influence/power (either a junta or a Suharto-style dictatorship);
- b. reversing the current situation towards a freer and more “democratic” state, without military influence; and
- c. Lastly, preventing the possibility of a return of militarism in the future (Orba 3.0 and beyond).

The above goals mean returning to reform, that is, restructuring and improvements within the system. However, supporting reform does not mean being reformist. As Errico Malatesta said, “We will carry out all the reforms that are possible, with the spirit of an army advancing, taking over enemy-occupied territory along its path.” This is all part of the strategy as formulated by the Black Rose Anarchist Federation in their article, *Building Power and Advancing: For Reforms, Not Reformism*:

“In short, we must reject the mentality of reformism, which sees short-term improvements, or even a series of reforms, as the ultimate goal in our struggle. We must also reject the mentality of purism, which rejects all reform movements as equating them with reformism, and therefore as counterproductive and useless. Instead, we must engage in the struggle for reform as a short-term program. This struggle for reform must be a means of building people’s power from the bottom up by organizing horizontally as a medium-term program. This medium-term program also includes increasing awareness, skills, solidarity, capacity, and organization. Even if we sometimes falter or lose temporarily, we must not stop building this power. We continue to grow, develop, and advance towards the possibility of a revolutionary situation, when we destroy the very causes of exploitation, domination, and oppression, and no longer just their symptoms.”

There are anarchists who are anti-organization and refuse to get involved in mass organizing. For them, the most important thing is to destroy the system of domination, to attack now, even if it is three, two or even alone. We salute them and will remain in solidarity with them if they are caught. Even so, we still believe in social revolution, and this requires the involvement of many people who are organized and eventually radicalized in the struggle. However, the participation of the people is not determined by ideological interest, “come on, become anarchists and build a society without a state and capitalism.” On the contrary, we want them to fight for themselves for issues of need and daily life that are close to the lives of the people.

Both failure and success in the struggle for reform will shape their consciousness to become revolutionary protagonists, namely as an organized social force that liberates itself. This involves a number of radicalizing aspects of the relentless accumulation of experience:

- a. During the struggle, we teach who the real enemy is and teach that our society is also divided into classes. They are able to recognize that the ruling class is responsible for and benefits from their suffering.
- b. By organizing, we teach them how to multiply their power. They are unable to create change by acting alone.
- c. If their methods of struggle are deemed ineffective, they can try more direct and combative methods of struggle.

- d. As long as they work together and stand in solidarity, they can recognize which ones have the potential to become allies and which ones will betray them.
- e. If they have organized, they have the ability to organize, mobilize and carry out better actions which will definitely be needed in the future during the revolutionary moment.

Of course we want to reduce exploitation, oppression and domination wherever possible. So we reject the notion that reform is useless. By getting involved in people's organizations for reform, we come into direct contact with the oppressed classes, not only to teach, but also to learn from them. From a struggle for reform, to a struggle aimed at revolution. The short-term agenda becomes a bridge for the medium and long-term agenda. We must not forget that in history a number of revolutions were born from a simple demand: bread. However, we are not interested in pushing the military back to the barracks; we want to burn down the barracks. We also do not want the return of civil supremacy to replace military supremacy, because both are the same part of the system of domination above; we want to build the power of the people at the bottom.

After analyzing, we have formulated a series of demands for institutional reform that hopefully will lead us to a number of revolutionary possibilities. The demands are formulated in the Five People's Demands (Litura) reform, which is basically a demilitarization effort. Litura includes both the cleansing of the government, military restructuring, human rights enforcement, and the allocation of the APBN:

- a. Cleansing the military from all civil affairs/positions: revoking the newly passed Military Law is not enough. If the Military Law is revoked, the military is still allowed to serve in 10 ministries and institutions and be tasked with 14 types of Military Operations Other Than War (OMSP) in the old Law. Therefore, if necessary, we should more radically push for the absence of civilian positions by the military in Ministries/Institutions and eliminate all types of Military Operations Other Than War (OMSP). Thus, the military's task is only to wage war, or defense from external attacks. The new TNI Bill must allow military officers to retire earlier. That means we demand the Military Law this time openly and with the involvement of people's organizations. These demands include the rejection of military cooperation with campuses and the disbandment of student regiments (menwa).
- b. Disband the military business. The military has been proven to use weapons and create an unhealthy and terror-filled business climate, and when its officers occupy management and commissioner positions, their positions are often abused to intimidate and deploy violence against protests by workers, farmers and indigenous peoples in agrarian and labor conflicts. The concept of self-financing which since the beginning of independence has been the reason for the military to seek its own money, logistics and weapons is no longer relevant today because the government has sought this.
- c. Disband the DPN and Territorial Command. We must prevent the possibility of military committees interfering in political decision-making through the DPN in the future under the guise of "consultation". The government has proven to continue to function without the DPN/DKN before. We must also destroy the military surveillance system (panopticon) whose eyes are widespread in society. Without the Territorial Command, we will have a society that is relatively free to assemble and associate (at least from the military).
- d. Bring to justice military officers (and retirees) who violate human rights, including Prabowo. This way, the military can see an example that they are not immune from the law if their active and retired officers are also dragged to court. Hopefully this will reduce the number of violence by the TNI-Polri and human rights violations.
- e. Reducing the budget of the Ministry of Defense and the Police, which are ranked no. 1 and no. 2 in the 2025 State Budget allocation and have continued to increase since the reform, while the budget for health, social protection and especially education, continues to be cut. There are more pressing needs such as the welfare of educators and health workers, the appointment of honorary teachers as ASN, as well as educational facilities and allowances that have a direct impact on improving the quality of life of the people.

Litura must be disseminated in two forms, namely a 5-point summary version on posters to social media posts, or a longer version in the form of articles or leaflets that are reworked by referring to the analysis document. This document must be printed, duplicated and distributed as widely as possible to warn of the threat of the formation of a civil-military dictatorship. The Litura itself must not only be expressed by specific anarchist organizations, but also simultaneously by anti-authoritarian networks in general to their political allies (left and progressive liberals) and all mass organizations where anarchists do social work. Thus, Litura becomes viral and hits the hearts of the people.

In more popular language, Litura can be summarized into the following 5 points:

The Five People's Demands (Litura)

1. Cleanse the military from all civil affairs/positions.
2. Disband military businesses.
3. Disband DPN-territorial command.
4. Bring human rights violators to justice.
5. Cut TNI-Polri budget, divert to health, education and social protection.

Then it closes with the sentence: until all is fulfilled!

Anti-Copyright



**SOUTHEAST ASIAN
ANARCHIST LIBRARY**

Anonymous

Neo-Orba: The Rise of Civil-Military Dictatorship in Indonesia

An Anarchist Analysis

May 2025

Arsip Bawah Tanah. See the original in Bahasa Indonesia:

<archive.org/details/neo-orba-bangkitnya-kediktatoran-sipil-militer_20250416>

sea.theanarchistlibrary.org